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ABSTRACT: 
 
This article investigates how firms exploit various forms of intellectual property (IP), 
often at the same time, in order to organize their strategic value seeking. The analysis 
is based upon confidential micro-data involving a survey of a set of 38 firms in the 
information and communication technology (ICT) sector in the United Kingdom. The 
article shows how three quarters of those firms exchange different types of 
proprietary (patents and copyright) and non-proprietary (open source and trade in 
non-patented technology) IP, in order to realize specific kinds of strategic value 
related to financial gain, competitive positioning, innovation and strategic alliances or 
relationships. The important role of alternative types of IP governance models 
(including various licensing forms, and other) associated with specific value seeking 
behaviours is also illustrated. The findings open up an important line of enquiry into 
the relative advantages conferred by different forms of IP markets and IP governance 
forms, and these insights in turn can provide useful indications to policymakers 
interested in promoting firms’ ability to exploit their IP.  
 
JEL: D02, D23, O31, O32, O34 
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1. Introduction  
It is now recognized that firms do not patent or copyright primarily to recover R&D 
expenditures, as suggested by mainstream intellectual property rights theory, but that 
their incentives are related to various types of strategic value they can obtain through 
licensing markets or via buying and selling of such rights (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 
2000; Levin et al., 1987; Mansfield, 1986). Nonetheless, not many studies are 
specifically aimed at shedding light on how firms use different forms of IP markets 
and IP governance forms for strategic purposes. The present article makes a 
contribution towards filling this analytical and evidence-based gap. In doing so, we 
address a range of limitations in existing research contributions. Mainly, such 
limitations concern: the range of IP mechanisms considered, which is usually limited 
to patents and other formally registered intellectual property rights such as trademarks 
and copyright; the level of detail at which such mechanisms are considered for 
strategic value seeking, which rarely extends to the micro-analysis of the specific IP 
governance forms applied in IP transactions; and the lack of investigations into the 
‘types’ of strategic benefits that firms seek when using these mechanisms. 
The information and communication technology (ICT) sector is interesting to 
research in this respect. This is because firms in this sector today utilize or experiment 
with a variety of IP protection mechanisms, including both proprietary IP (patents, 
copyrights) and non-proprietary IP (open source, IP with no formal protection)1. The 
extent to which IP policy should embrace non-proprietary IP in the ICT sector, or it 
should instead mainly focus on extending laws and regulation for proprietary IP such 
as patents, has been intensively discussed for some time – for example, by the EU 
software hearing in the European Parliament in Brussels 2002-2005, IBM (2006), and 
by the current OECD Working Party for SME and Entrepreneurship (WPSMEE2) 
2010-11. Understanding the extent to which firms exploit different forms of IP and 
the strategic objectives that underpin the choice to exploit each of these forms, is 
                                                          
1
 The terms ‘proprietary’ and ‘non-proprietary’ have become popular in relation to software. 
Proprietary software is software with restrictions on using, sharing, copying and modifying it, as 
enforced by the proprietor; such restrictions are achieved by either legal means (via patent and 
copyright law) and/or technical means (e.g. by releasing machine-readable binaries to users and 
withholding the human-readable source code). In non-proprietary software (e.g. open source software, 
freeware, shareware etc.) all or some of those restrictions are relaxed. The terms are also used more 
broadly to refer to protection modes applied to a variety of IP, not limited to software. 
2
 WPSMEE is concerned with “SME Innovation and Management of Intellectual Assets in Creative 
Industries and Selected Manufacturing Industries". The UK contribution involves ICT firms (software 
and hardware) and is based upon the same evidence (i.e. UKNOW data base) which informs this 
article. 
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crucial in order to inform policymaking in the context of a rapidly changing industry 
such as ICT. 
There are also other arguments for researching strategic value seeking from IP 
in this sector more fully. First, this sector is very important to most economies, 
including the UK’s. In general, ICT has been considered the key driver of economic 
growth since at least the 1980s (Freeman and Perez, 1988); recent data from the UK 
Innovation Survey (Robson and Haigh, 2008) confirm that a large component (more 
than 50%) of all UK firms’ innovation activities consist in acquisition of products 
from the ICT sector such as software and computer hardware. Second, it is a sector 
where intellectual assets are particularly important components of firm value and 
where their acquisition is often crucial for innovation to take place (Cockburn, 2007). 
Third, the sector has seen an increase of activity in IP transactions (for example, see 
Grindley and Teece, 2008, on the increase of licensing and non-licensing agreements 
in the computer industry). One of the reasons for this perceived increase is due to the 
high level of disintegration of ICT modules in the production of products and 
components, especially software. Such activities in fact involve cumulative and 
incremental processes where different modules need to be combined into more 
complex systems (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001) to create commercially 
desirable products. The complex technologies underpinning the ICT industry and the 
challenge of short product life-cycles mean that firms are inclined to become involved 
in IP transactions, especially because product innovation in the ICT sector is very 
closely tied to time. Moreover, many ICT firms, especially software firms, have 
limited investment in downstream commercialisation capabilities, and usually choose 
to license to bigger software firms (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001): the use of 
IP gives them a platform to be more competitive. 
 
Aim and evidence base 
The particular aim of this article is to show how ICT firms based in the UK engage in 
various IP transactions within both proprietary (patent and copyright) and non-
proprietary (open source and no protection) IP markets, in order to realize strategic 
corporate value, related to financial gain, competitive positioning, innovation and 
strategic alliances or relationships. The roles played, in this value seeking process, by 
different IP governance forms (such as various forms of licensing arrangements, etc.) 
are also investigated. 
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The article is based upon confidential micro data on a set of 38 UK-based firms 
in the ICT sector (comprising software
3
 and hardware firms), collected between 
October 2008 and March 2009. The firm evidence is drawn from the UKNOW 
database
4
 comprising data collected from a survey of German pharmaceutical firms, 
UK ICT firms and UK universities. Further details on the ICT sample entering this 
research paper is presented in Section 3. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the general analytical 
framework and describes the research questions. Section 3 introduces the data on 
which the analysis is based. In Section 4 we present the analysis and discuss the 
results. Section 5 concludes on the organization of strategic value seeking from 
proprietary and non-proprietary IP. 
 
2. IP markets, IP governance and strategic value seeking 
Andersen and Konzelmann (2008) outline several types of market platforms where IP 
can be exchanged, in relation to patents and copyright. They explain how these are 
embedded in various social relations as defined by different governance forms, 
ranging from simple arrangements (buying and selling, licensing in and out) to more 
complex ones such as cross-licensing and pooling of patents and copyright
5
. Such 
transactions are not expected to be exclusive; rather, most firms would presumably 
participate in several different forms. 
Value can also be generated through exchange of non-proprietary IP. Today, the 
most common non-proprietary model is the open source software development 
method. It can be compared to what used to be called the free software. Free Software 
and Open Source software are concerned with users’ freedom to run, copy, distribute, 
study, change and improve the software
6
. The open source licensing strategy often 
                                                          
3
 It is important to note software inventions are protected differently internationally: in Europe and 
Japan, a piece of software can be patent-protected if it reflects a technical advancement. In this sense, it 
is protected as computer programs (criteria: the software idea has to be new and inventive or novel and 
non-obvious). In the USA, a piece of software can be patent-protected as long as it is ‘in the 
technological arts’: that is, the software may not necessarily be of technical character, but it needs to be 
implemented via computers to get the protection. In this sense, it is protected as business methods. This 
meets UN’s definition of technology: ‘a combination of equipment and knowledge’. (Criteria: the 
software idea has to be useful, concrete and tangible results has to be provided) 
4
 The database was developed as part of Work Package 3.2: "An IPR Regime in Support of a 
Knowledge Based Economy" of the UKNOW (Understanding the Relationship between Knowledge 
and Competitiveness in the Enlarged EU’) (2005-2009) project of the EU 6th Framework Programme. 
5
 Not all mentioned governance forms exist for copyright (see Table 1). 
6
 In this sense, the concept ‘Free’ or ‘Open’ may be associated with the concept of ‘freedom’ or liberty. 
It does not mean getting something for free in terms of zero price (http://www.gnu.org/). For a detailed 
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takes the form of ‘GNU General Public License (GPL)’. Whereas intellectual 
property rights law, in its current form, provides the right to exclude anyone from 
using, modifying and redistributing copies of an author’s work as well as a right to 
withhold the source-code, a GPL license transfers these rights to the commons in 
order to ensure access.  This ensures that every person who receives a copy of a work 
has the same rights to study, use, modify, and also redistribute both the work, and 
derived versions of the work. Such licenses also require that the same license terms 
apply to all redistributed versions of the work. Therefore, open source changes the 
terms from ‘All Rights Reserved’ to ‘Some Rights Reserved’: the rights which are not 
reserved move into the ‘public domain’ or commons. Relaxing some of the 
restrictions of the intellectual property rights system is also becoming more common 
in other sectors than software, and it is usually linked to firms’ open innovation 
strategies. Examples include ‘Creative Commons’ in the creative industries; 
‘Wikipedia’ and ‘Wiki’ in publishing; Open source in media (‘Open Source 
Journalism’ such as Webblogs, Messageboards, and Open Document; ‘Open Source 
Movie Production’; ‘Open Source Documentary’; ‘Open Source Filmmaking’); Open 
source in education and scientific research (e.g. Science Commons); and Open source 
health care and medicine, such as the Tropical Disease Initiative, and the not-for-
profit “virtual pharmas” such as the Institute for One World Health and the Drugs for 
Neglected Diseases Initiative. 
Many firms also exchange non-protected technology in the market. Thus, 
although many stakeholders (such as the Free Software and Open Source 
communities and the Foundation for Free Information Infrastructure) do not advocate 
putting non-protected technology into the public domain, because they believe that 
this would allow uncooperative individuals and firms to convert openly-developed 
inventions into proprietary technology, many firms still do. A reason could be that the 
patent system is too resource-demanding in terms of application costs, search costs in 
order to avoid duplication of invention, and enforcement costs regarding possible 
court cases. Or, the technological solution is not at the forefront from a technical point 
of view (so it does not satisfy the novelty criteria for patent protection), but it is still 
very productive for industry and therefore traded in the market. The reason could also 
be that the technology is difficult to understand and imitate, or that it is so client-
                                                                                                                                                                      
definition, see the website of the free Software Community: http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-
sw.html#exportcontrol. 
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based that it has no wider interest of other firms. Finally, it could be due to the fact 
that the product life-cycle is so short that it makes sense to launch the unprotected 
technology on the market. The latter would indicate that it does not matter whether 
the technology is protected (that is, the inventor or innovator faces first-mover 
advantage), or simply that the patent system is too slow compared to the short product 
life-cycle that many firms face. 
We shed further light on these issues in section 4 where we investigate which IP 
transactions firms engage into. We assess the relative importance of the different 
forms of IP (considering four types of IP: patents, open source, copyright, non-
patented technology). We also investigate the various strategic reasons for firms to 
use different types of IP, and different governance forms when exchanging their IP, 
and we expect to find that certain IP markets are used to gain certain strategic 
benefits. This means that firms have a clear strategy when deciding on which IP 
markets to engage in.  
Building upon the relevant literature on the use of patents (see points (i) to (iv) 
below), which captures the most widely debated reasons for firms to exchange IP, in 
section 4.1 we particularly explore four main categories of strategic benefits to be 
realized through participation in different types of IP markets (considering patents, 
copyright, open source and technology with no protection):  
(i) Benefits relating to innovation, in that the trade of IP should facilitate 
innovation diffusion (see e.g. Arrow 1962; Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991, Arora et al, 
2001; Gans and Stern, 2000) and enhance innovation processes, often in a social 
process of interaction with other individuals and organizations, and thereby also 
enable the development of better technology or enable standardization and 
technological compatibility (see e.g. Merges and Nelson 1990, 1994; Winter 1993; 
Plant 1934). Arora et al (2001) suggest that IP exchange in the ICT sector has proved 
in many cases to be a powerful instrument for codifying knowledge and technologies. 
In fact, in order for IP to be transferred easily to other organisations, firms are 
encouraged to develop standard architectures and software components. This in turn 
will encourage more innovation from individuals or companies.  
(ii) Benefits relating to market positioning and competitiveness, linked to the 
ability to gain or maintain market share due to the exclusive access to certain IP (see 
e.g. Rivette and Kline 2000; Cohen et al. 2000; Granstrand 1999).  
 8 
(iii) Benefits relating to financial gain in terms of ability to derive income from 
transactions in IP markets, or conversely to cut costs by forsaking IP protection, or 
entering cross-licensing agreements, and even in terms of increased ability to raise 
capital thanks to the reporting of IP as strategic assets (see e.g. Coriat and Orsi 2002; 
Rivette and Kline 2000).  
(iv) Benefits relating to the building of strategic alliances or relationships with 
or within industry (see e.g. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 1993; Teece 1986).  
Andersen and Konzelmann (2008) suggest that also the choice of the specific 
governance forms through which IP is transferred or acquired depends upon the type 
of financial and non-financial value that the stakeholders seek to realize: in other 
words, they suggest that there is a relationship between the choice of a certain IP 
governance form, for a specific type of IP, and the strategic benefits that firms seek to 
obtain from the transaction. For example, Mann (2005) highlighted in his research 
that some firms in the software industry obtain substantial amount of revenue through 
licensing, which confers direct income. Arora et al (2001) show that software firms 
have different competitive strategies, as many of them focus only on licensing their 
technology instead of investing into the business where their technologies are used. 
We expect ICT firms to seek to realize specific types of value from the choice of 
specific IP governance forms, and we investigate this by exploring (in section 4.2) 
whether there is a relationship between benefit-seeking and the choice of IP 
governance forms. 
 
3. Data  
The research is based upon structured (questionnaire-based) interviews with a set of 
38 ICT firms in the UK. The firms have been extracted from the overall population of 
firms based in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, with one or more 
employees, active in the ICT sector (their sector of activity was identified by NACE 
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codes
7
). According to the FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) database, the total 
number of firms operating under the selected NACE codes is 959
8
. 
The subset of firms interviewed are representative of the overall population in 
terms of number of employees and turnover (the two variables are strongly 
correlated). The distribution of these variables is shown in Table 1. The median 
respondent (at 50% percentile) is a firm with 74 employees and latest turnover of 
8,979,116 GBP, localized in England and active in the field of software publishing. If 
we consider the distribution of firms by code of economic activity, response rates are 
quite similar across groups (3.3% for firms active in software publishing, 4.1% for 
firms active in hardware production, and 5.8% for firms with other codes). 
 
Table 1. Size distribution of population and respondents 
Category Size Population Interviewed firms 
 n firms 959 38 
  % % 
n. employees 
less than 10 17.4 23.7 
between 11 and 50 30.9 13.2 
between 51 and 250 37.5 42.1 
more than 250 14.1 21.1 
Latest turnover (GBP) 
less than 1 million 15.3 26.3 
between 1 and 10 million 40.0 23.7 
between 10 and 50 million 25.9 28.9 
more than 50 million 12.7 15.8 
 
The firms were contacted by telephone and post with the purpose to identify 
knowledgeable respondents (such as R&D manager, CEO, head of IP department, or 
others)
9
, who were then asked to fill in the questionnaire online. Field work was 
carried out in the period between October 2008 and April 2009. 
Each question referred, separately, to two types of proprietary IP (patents and 
copyright) and two types of non-proprietary IP (open source and non-patented 
                                                          
7
 These are: NACE rev. 1 codes 7221 - software publishing, 3002 - manufacturing of computers and 
other information processing equipment, 322 - manufacture of television and radio transmitters and 
apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy, 323 - manufacture of television and radio receivers, 
sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods. These codes identify 
companies producing both software and hardware. For simplicity, we refer to the firms in this sample 
as ‘ICT firms’. 
8
 We reached this number after removing double entries of companies that are no longer in business 
and of companies whose main activity is not ICT-related, for example, because FAME reported wrong 
or outdated NACE codes. 
9
 More precisely, the 38 interviews were conducted with 12 CEOs/Directors/Owners, 9 R&D 
Managers/Chief Technology Officers/Heads of Operations, 10 IP Managers and 7 people in other 
positions. 
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technology). For each type of IP, the respondents were asked to consider different 
governance forms, as detailed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Types of IP and IP governance 
Types of IP IP Governance forms (variables) 
Patents as a tool for the 
protection of novel ideas 
Selling patents 
Buying patents 
Out-licensing patents 
In-licensing patents 
Cross licensing patents 
Participation in patent pools 
Buying university-owned patents 
Licensing university-owned patents 
Copyright as a tool for the 
protection of original 
creative expressions 
Selling copyright 
Buying copyright 
Out-licensing copyright 
In licensing copyright 
Buying university-owned copyright 
Licensing university-owned copyright 
Open source’ IP as a tool for 
the protection of original 
ideas and creative 
expressions 
Participating in open source software development 
Participating in open source pharmaceutical projects 
Participating in other open source communities 
‘Non patented’ ideas 
Releasing not patented product or process innovations to the public 
Releasing not patented product or process innovations to private firms 
Using not patented product or process innovations 
Collaborating with universities without patent restrictions 
 
A first set of questions referred to the extent and intensity with which firms 
participate in each form of IP exchange and in each governance form. Firms were 
asked about their stock of patents owned and licensed, whether they engaged in each 
type of patent governance, and if so the number of transactions in the last two years. 
With respect to open source, non-patented technology and copyright, firms were 
asked whether they engaged in each governance form, and if so the number of 
transactions they realized in the last two years. 
A second set of questions referred to the strategic benefits sought when trading 
IP. For each type of IP and each governance form, firms were asked to choose up to 
five strategic benefits that they considered important, selecting them from a list of 13 
benefits, which can be divided into four broad categories, as listed in Table 3 
(identified on the basis of a review of the patent literature, as discussed in section 2).  
 
Table 3. Strategic benefits which firms seek from IP transactions 
Category of benefits Specific strategic benefits  
Financial gain  Direct income from market transactions 
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 Cost cutting 
 Increasing ability to raise venture capital 
Competitive positioning 
 Increasing market share  
 Professional recognition or brand recognition  
 Competitive signalling 
Innovation 
 Using the best inventions, innovations, creative 
expressions 
 Making or using compatible technology or creative 
expressions 
 Developing better technology or creative expressions 
 Benefiting from user or supplier involvement as a 
development strategy 
Strategic relationships   
 Building informal relationships with industry networks 
 Increasing ability to enter collaborative agreements 
 Giving something to the community 
 
Finally, firms were requested to provide some general information: geographic 
localization (derived from address), ownership (independent or subsidiary company), 
size (current number of employees, current yearly turnover), yearly expenditure in 
R&D, geographic extension of the firm’s main market (domestic or international), and 
main field of activity. A few additional variables relating to firm characteristics were 
derived from the FAME database: company name, full address, telephone number, 
primary UK SIC (2003) code, director’s name and position, e-mail, website, last 
turnover (in thousands of GBP), number of employees. 
 
4. Analysis and results 
 
4.1. Strategic value seeking from the exchange of IP 
Of the 38 firms that were interviewed, we found that 28 firms (73.7%) exchange one 
or more of the IP considered for this analysis. (This does not mean that the remaining 
10 are not active in generating and protecting IP, but simply that they do not engage 
in IP transactions in these IP markets.) Among those 28 firms, 10 (35.7%) are 
involved in transactions around only one type of IP, while most (18 firms, that is 
64.3%) are involved in transactions around two or more types of IP (more precisely: 
10 firms engage in one type of IP, 12 firms engage in two types of IP, 3 firms engage 
in three, and 3 firms engage in all four types of IP). Furthermore, as shown in Figure 
1, while 5 firms (17.9%) only exchange proprietary IP (patents and/or copyright) and 
11 firms (39.3%) use a combination of proprietary and non-proprietary forms of 
protection of their IP, the greatest share of firms that exchange IP only exchange non-
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proprietary forms (12 firms, or 42.9%). These results indicate that most of the firms 
exchange intellectual property that is not exclusively protected. 
 
Figure 1. Forms of IP exchanged by ICT firms 
 
 
 
Table 4 summarizes the firms’ strategic reasons (in terms of value seeking) for 
the use of different types of IP markets. Percentages are computed with respect to the 
numbers of firms that exchange each type of IP (the columns do not sum to 100% 
since each firm could choose more than one category of benefits)10.  
 
 
Table 4. Types of strategic benefits from exchange of different types of IP 
 Patents Copyright Open source 
Non-patented 
innovations 
Number of firms. 13 9 14 19 
Categories of strategic 
benefits: 
% of firms 
involved in 
% of firms 
involved in 
% of firms 
involved in open 
% of firms 
involved in non-
                                                          
10
 In order to construct the % shares presented in Table 4, the firms’ responses given with respect to 
each benefit and each governance form were aggregated into the four main categories (‘finance’, 
‘innovation’, ‘strategic relationships’, ‘market/competitive positioning’) for each of the four forms of 
IP identified in table 2, taking care to avoid double-counting.  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Patents Copyright Open source Non-patented
innovations
Only
proprietary
Only non-
proprietary
Both
proprietary
and non-
proprietary
Types of IP Nature of IP marketplace
 13 
patents copyright source patented 
innovation 
Financial gain 54 56 50 53 
Competitive 
positioning 
54 44 64 58 
Innovation 69 44 93 89 
Strategic relationships 54 22 64 58 
No option chosen 23 33 7 5 
 
Firms involved in proprietary (patent and copyright) and non proprietary (open 
source and technology with no protection) IP transactions seek all kinds of benefits 
from exchanging all forms of IP, but with different intensity. In most cases, the most 
important strategic benefits relate to improving innovation processes; the only 
exception is copyright, where innovation benefits are the second most important 
category after benefits relating to financial gain. The importance of innovation 
benefits for firms that exchange patent and copyright is in line with the view that IPR 
protection promotes innovation (see Dosi et al, 2006, for an overview of the debate on 
the relationship between patenting and innovation activity). However, fostering 
innovation is the most important benefit also for firms that engage in open source and 
non-patented technology. The fact that firms use non-proprietary IP to improve their 
innovation processes is also quite well known. The literature on open source has 
remarked that firms engage in open source in order to use and develop better 
innovations (Kuan, 2001), especially when user-driven (Bessen, 2002). The 
importance of standardization and compatibility, which allow firms to enlarge their 
user bases, has also been noticed (Wichmann, 2002a and 2002b).  
Most firms that exchange patents also seek benefits relating to financial gain, 
competitive positioning, and the building of strategic relationships. In the case of 
copyright, financial gain is indeed the most important benefit sought, followed by 
innovation and competitive positioning. When exchanging the two non-proprietary 
forms of IP, the second most important categories of benefits, after innovation, 
concern the building of strategic relationships and competitive positioning.  
Table 5 shows the firms’ answers with respect to the specific benefits within 
each category (as listed in table 3). Also in this table, percentages are computed with 
respect to the numbers which include only firms that exchange a specific type of IP, 
and the columns do not sum to 100% since each firm could choose up to five strategic 
benefits. 
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Table 5. Specific benefits from exchange of different types of IP 
  Patents Copyright 
Open 
source 
Non-
patented 
innovations 
 Number of firms 13 9 14 19 
Categories 
of strategic 
benefits 
Strategic benefits 
% of firms 
involved in 
patent 
markets 
% of firms 
involved in 
copyright 
markets 
% of 
firms 
involved 
in open 
source 
% of firms 
involved in 
markets for 
non-
patented 
innovations 
Financial 
gain 
Direct income from market 
transaction 
23 44 - 32 
Cost cutting 38 11 50 26 
Increasing ability to raise 
venture capital 
8 22 0 11 
Competitive 
positioning 
Increasing market share 62 33 43 26 
Professional recognition or 
brand recognition 
23 22 29 26 
Competitive signalling 31 11 14 16 
Innovation 
Being able to use the best 
inventions, innovations, creative 
expressions 
62 22 57 53 
Making or using compatible 
technology or creative 
expressions 
23 0 71 58 
Developing better technology or 
creative expressions 
31 44 57 53 
Benefiting from user or supplier 
involvement as a development 
strategy 
8 22 21 16 
Strategic 
relationships 
Building informal relationships 
with industry networks 
23 11 36 47 
Increasing ability to enter 
collaborative agreements 
46 11 29 32 
Giving something to the 
community 
0 0 36 11 
 
With respect to financial benefits, the exchange of copyright takes place mainly 
because firms seek to derive income and the same goes for non-patented innovation, 
while cost cutting is the most important financial benefits that firms seek from open 
source.  
62% of firms that exchange patents believe that patents allow them to use the 
best innovations, but similar shares of firms believe that they can use the best 
innovations by engaging in open source and by exchanging non-patented technology 
(57% and 53% respectively). Engagement in non-proprietary IP transactions allows 
firms to make or use compatible technology (71% of firms that use open source, 58% 
of those that exchange non-patented technology), whereas this is not an important 
reported reason when firms protect their technology through patents. Reliance on 
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open source (57%), non-patented technology (53%) and copyright (44%) is also 
regarded as having distinctive advantages in terms of allowing the development of 
better technology, which, in the former two cases, sometimes takes place through the 
involvement of users (22% and 21% respectively).  
The exchange of open source and non-patented innovations is believed to allow 
firms to build relationships with industry networks (36% and 47% respectively) and 
to increase their ability to enter collaborative agreements (29% and 32%). 36% of 
firms engaging in open source also find motivation in ‘giving something to the 
community’. Firms have been known to contribute to open source projects out of 
individual intrinsic and social motivations (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003) especially 
when the technology is not crucial to the firm’s competitive advantage (Henkel, 
2002). 
In terms of competitive positioning, 62% of firms that exchange patents do so in 
order to gain market share. Since competitive positioning is also sought by 43% of 
firms that engage in open source (and by 26% of firms that exchange non-patented 
innovations), this suggests that ICT firms do not attribute exclusive importance to the 
acquisition of patents as a means to prevent imitation and hence maintain market 
share: the importance of accessing a wider user base by developing compatible 
technologies probably plays an important role in market strategies. This is consistent 
with findings from the literature, which point to the importance to factors other than 
patent protection, such as lead time and secrecy, to improve market positioning 
(Levin et al, 1987). Engagement in non-proprietary IP also allows firms to gain 
professional or brand recognition. 
In sum, three patterns stand out. First, while conventional economic theory 
suggests that proprietary IP protection is necessary to generate income from 
innovation and therefore to induce firms to invest in R&D (i.e. costly innovation 
processes) (Arrow, 1962), the responses from our set of ICT firms suggest that all 
forms of IP (not only proprietary ones) provide firms with benefits related to financial 
gains. Second, while it is often thought that IPRs are necessary in order to create 
markets for technology that can enter into other firms’ innovation processes, we find 
that greater shares of firms that seek innovation related benefits do so from engaging 
in the exchange of open source and non-patented technology (in line with the open 
innovation argument: Chesbrough 2003). Third, a fairly high share of firms exchanges 
non-proprietary IP (relative to proprietary IP) in order to increase their market share 
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or competitive positioning. Overall, the results point to the strategic importance of 
factors other than patent protection in some sectors (such as the ICT sector), and how 
the strategic use of non-proprietary IP needs to be acknowledged more fully in the 
mainstream literature.  
 
4.2. The strategic advantages of different IP governance forms 
We now move on to discuss the role of governance structures in the value seeking 
process through IP transactions.  
In the three years previous to the survey, firms have engaged in a much higher 
number of IP transactions involving non-proprietary rather than proprietary IP. On 
average
11
, firms have bought 0.75 patents, have sold zero patents, have in-licensed 1, 
have out-licensed 2.5 and have cross-licensed 1.2. No firms provided information 
about participation in patent pools. In the same period, they have engaged in 93.3 
open source software transactions and in 51 transactions involving other open source 
IP, they have released 135 non-patented products to the public and 60.5 to private 
firms, they have used 50.37 non-patented products, and they have exchanged non-
patented knowledge with 1.75 universities.  
We find that the 28 ICT firms active in our selected IP markets are engaged in a 
variety of governance forms for IP transactions, often at the same time.  
Of the 13 firms that exchange patents, most out-license (9 firms, or 69%) and 
in-license (10, or 77%) patents; 7 (54%) engage in cross-patenting and/or in buying 
patents, and 5 (39%) in selling patents. Only 3 (23%) participate in patent pools. 9 
firms exchange copyright; of these, 5 (56%) buy copyright, 4 (44%) sell copyright, 3  
33%) out-license it and 2 (22%) in-license it. Only 3 firms in-license university 
patents (23%), 1 (8%) buys university patents, 1 (8%) buys and in-licenses university 
copyright. We thus find that patented university knowledge is not a key strategy to 
our set of ICT firms. This is consistent with the results of other investigations with 
respect to the software industry (see e.g. Cohen et al, 2002). Due to the particularly 
small number of firms that engage in the transaction of university IP, in the rest of the 
article we do not consider these governance forms.    
With respect to non-proprietary IP, all the 14 firms that engage in open source 
do so in software (100%), and 6 of them (43%) also participate in other open source 
                                                          
11
 Averages are computed with respect to the subset of firms that have provided this information, for 
each type of IP and each IP governance form. 
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communities. Of the 19 firms that exchange non-patented technology, 7 (37%) release 
technology to the public, 11 (58%) release non-patented technology to private firms, 
13 (68%) use non-patented technology, and 6 (32%) collaborate with universities with 
no patent restrictions.   
Figure 2 shows the shares of firms that engage in each governance form, both as 
a share of the firms that are active in that specific IP market, and as a share of all IP-
active firms. Participation rates in each non-proprietary IP governance form range 
between 25% and 50% of all IP active firms, while participation rates in proprietary 
IP governance forms range between 7% and 36% of all IP active firms.  
 
Figure 2. Participation in IP governance forms 
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Building upon Andersen and Konzelmann (2008), we hypothesized that, for 
each type of IP, there is a link between the governance form in which firms engage 
and the benefits that they seek. That is, benefits are not only specific to certain types 
of IP (as identified in section 4.1), but also to particular IP governance forms.  
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To address this issue, we build an index that measures the extent to which 
organizations that take part in a certain governance form ‘specialize’ in seeking a 
certain benefit, relative to the overall importance of this benefit. Because this index is 
constructed exactly as the widely used Revealed Technological Advantage index and 
Revealed Comparative Advantage index, we refer to it as the index of ‘Revealed 
Governance Advantage’ (RGA)12.  
Let xij be the number of times that benefit i is chosen in governance form j, and 
∑ixij the number of times that all benefits are chosen in governance form j; let ∑jxij be 
the number of times that benefit i is chosen in all governance forms, and ∑i∑jxij the 
total number of benefits chosen in all governance forms (that is, the index is the ratio 
between the share of benefit i in governance form j and the share of benefit i in all 
governance forms). Then, for a certain governance form, the revealed governance 
advantage index is: 
(1) RGA = (xij/∑ixij)/(∑jxij/∑i∑jxij) 
This index allows us to compare the relative advantage of the various 
governance forms in allowing firms to reach certain benefits. It only assumes positive 
values: a value that is smaller than 1 indicates that governance form j is relatively 
under-specialized in benefit i, while a value greater than 1 indicates that governance 
form j is relatively over-specialized in that benefit. 
The same index can be computed at the level of overall types of IP markets. The 
‘Revealed IP Market Advantage’ index (which measures the extent to which 
organizations that engage in a certain type of IP markets ‘specialize’ in seeking a 
certain benefit, relative to the overall importance of this benefit) is computed as 
(2) ‘Revealed IP Market Advantage’ (RMA) = 
(yij/∑iyij)/(∑jyij/∑i∑jyij) 
where yij is the number of times that benefit i is chosen when exchanging IP j, 
∑iyij the number of times that all benefits are chosen when exchanging IP j, ∑jyij is the 
number of times that benefit i is chosen when exchanging all types of IP, and ∑i∑jyij 
is the total number of benefits chosen when exchanging all types of IP (that is, the 
                                                          
12
 The RGA for a specific strategic benefit is constructed in a similar way to the Revealed 
Technological Advantages (RTA) index (first developed and used in patent statistics by Keith Pavitt 
and John Cantwell) and the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index, which is an index (first 
developed and used in international economics by Bela Balassa) for calculating the relative advantage 
or disadvantage of a certain country in a certain class of goods or services as evidenced by trade flows.  
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index is the ratio between the share of benefit i for IP j and the share of benefit i for 
all types of IP). 
This index allows us to compare the relative advantage of the various types of 
IP in allowing firms to reach certain benefits
13
. 
 
Table 6. ‘Revealed governance advantage (RGA)’ and ‘revealed IP market advantage 
(RMA)’ for the various benefits – proprietary IP 
Types of IP markets or  
IP governance forms 
RMA index or RGA index 
 
Financial 
gain 
Innovation 
Strategic 
relationships 
Competitive 
positioning 
Patents 1.02 0.95 0.94 1.12 
 Selling patents 4.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Buying patents 0.37 1.27 0.54 1.61 
 Out-licensing patents 1.81 0.62 0.65 0.98 
 In-licensing patents 0.48 1.15 1.39 1.04 
 Cross-licensing patents 1.25 0.86 1.36 0.68 
 Patent pools 0.00 2.79 0.00 0.00 
Copyright 1.38 0.90 0.75 1.00 
 Selling copyright 1.11 0.83 1.67 0.83 
 Buying copyright 0.48 1.43 1.43 0.71 
 Out-licensing copyright 1.67 0.42 0.00 1.67 
 In-licensing copyright 0.00 2.50 0.00 0.00 
Open source 0.85 1.03 1.18 0.94 
 Open source software 1.19 0.98 0.94 0.95 
 Other open source 
communities 
0.47 1.05 1.16 1.13 
Non-patented innovations 1.00 1.04 0.97 0.97 
 Releasing not patented 
innovations to the public 
0.81 0.74 1.02 1.51 
 Releasing not patented 
innovations to private firms 
1.03 0.94 1.13 0.96 
 Using not patented 
innovations 
0.93 1.41 0.66 0.75 
 Collaborating with 
universities without patents 
1.40 0.77 1.32 0.75 
 
We first consider proprietary IP. The values of the RGA index in Table 6 show 
that financial gains are particularly sought when selling, out-licensing and cross-
licensing patents or copyright, probably since these transactions provide firms with 
direct income. This supports the results from Mann (2005), which highlight that some 
firms in the software industry obtain substantial amounts of revenue through 
licensing. Innovation benefits are particularly sought when buying and in-licensing 
                                                          
13
 In order to compute the RGA and RMA indexes, the firms’ responses given with respect to each 
benefit were aggregated into the four main categories (‘financial gain’, ‘innovation’, ‘strategic 
relationships’, ‘competitive positioning’) for each type of IP, taking care to avoid double-counting.  
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patents and copyright, since these activities allow firms to use the best innovations. 
We find that firms improve their competitive position particularly by in-licensing and 
buying patents – which grants them exclusive access to certain technologies, and 
sometimes allows them to control the overall production process and take advantage 
of economies of scale (Reitzig, 2004) – or by out-licensing copyright - probably in 
order to create some technological dependency from their clients. This phenomenon is 
what Merges and Nelson (1990) described as ‘cumulative system technologies’, 
where the connectivity makes new technology more desirable than others.  
When we consider non-proprietary IP, we find that releasing non-patented 
technology to the public allows firms to improve their market position, confirming the 
importance, in the ICT industry, to build a base of users. This shows the importance 
of other factors other than patent protection in improving market positioning (Levin et 
al, 1987).  
Innovation benefits are mainly sought when using non-patented technology, 
which give firms access to the best innovations. Firms particularly use collaborations 
with universities in order to build strategic relationships and to gain financially, 
deriving income and saving on IP protection costs. 
In the case of open source - apart from financial benefits which are particularly 
sought from open source software development - there is not much difference in the 
extent to which each benefit is sought by firms engaging in open source software and 
by those participating in other open source communities.  
With respect to the IP markets, the values of the RMA index (also displayed in 
Table 6) show that firms particularly seek benefits relating to innovation and the 
building of strategic relationships when they engage in open source, financial gains 
when they engage in copyright, and competitive positioning benefits when they 
engage in patents. 
In order to quantify the strength of the results (i.e. the extent to which a certain 
benefit is specific to one or a few governance forms, or whether it is equally sought in 
different governance forms) we compute the coefficient of variation of the RGA 
index across the governance forms ( RGA/µ RGA ·100%). Similarly, we quantify the 
extent to which a benefit is specific to a certain type of IP markets by computing the 
coefficient of variation of the RMA index across types of IP markets ( RMA/µ RMA 
·100%). The higher the coefficient of variation, the more a certain benefit is specific 
 21 
to one or few governance forms, or to a certain type of IP market, so the stronger is 
the revealed advantage. 
 
Table 7. Coefficients of variation across governance forms and types of IP markets 
 
Financial 
gain 
Innovation 
Strategic 
relationships 
Competitive 
positioning 
Index of governance specialization 
(patents): RGA/µ RGA *100% 
112.32 84.04 94.05 87.98 
Index of governance specialization 
(copyright): RGA/µ RGA *100% 
89.55 69.87 116.15 85.00 
Index of governance specialization 
(open source): RGA/µ RGA *100% 
61.25 4.46 14.63 12.08 
Index of governance specialization 
(non-patented technology): RGA/µ 
RGA *100% 
24.38 32.03 26.88 36.51 
Index of IP specialization: RMA/µ 
RMA *100% 
21.34 6.88 18.52 7.98 
 
The results in Table 7 show that, in the case of proprietary IP, all benefits are 
very specific to certain governance forms (the standard deviation of the RGA index is 
greater than the mean by more than 20%) while in the case of open source and non-
patented innovations, benefits are similarly sought across all governance forms (with 
the exception of financial benefits, which are very specific to open source software 
development). The coefficients of variation of the RMA indexes confirm that all kinds 
of benefits are sought across all forms of IP (although with differences in terms of 
relative shares, as shown in section 4.1). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 The analysis of the intensity and the strategic reasons for which UK-based ICT firms 
exchange different types of IP sheds new light on the relationship between the firms’ 
strategic objectives when creating value from IP and their choice of IP markets and IP 
governance in realizing this value. 
ICT firms participate in a variety of proprietary and non-proprietary IP markets, 
to control and trade their IP assets. While mainstream analyses on value creation from 
IP focus on the exchange of patents, our results show that firms in the ICT industry 
that engage in non-proprietary IP at least as intensively as in proprietary ones (as 
evidenced by data such as the average numbers of IP transactions), and suggest that 
greater attention should be paid to them, especially by policymakers. Additionally, 
technology and science policies are usually based upon the assumption that firms 
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mostly value their IP in the form of patents, but if the pattern exhibited by our 
interviewed firms turns out to be general, then focusing only on proprietary IP 
exchange would ignore a large share of ICT companies’ IP transactions. Thus, 
implementing policies in order to support only the enforcement of IP protection may 
have limited effect on corporate value creation, as the value-creation potential of other 
forms of IP is not fully exploited.  
The finding that ICT firms gain a wide range of different strategic benefits 
(related to innovation, financial gain, competitive positioning, and strategic 
relationships) from participation in different IP markets (e.g. patent, open-source IP, 
non-patented technology) also suggests a counter-argument for the mainstream view 
that primarily proprietary or patent protection allows firms to develop significant 
value. For example, according to our firms, patent protection is not necessarily the 
only tool through which ‘best’ innovations can be protected, and patent protection is 
not always necessary to develop superior innovations. Further, patents are not always 
necessary in order to increase market share. Often technological compatibility 
achieved through participation in non-proprietary IP, and the professional recognition 
that these activities confer, are more important in order to improve market 
positioning. Also, financial gains are accrued when exchanging all forms of IP, not 
just proprietary ones. Moreover, the mainstream argument that patents are of primary 
importance for value creation from ideas, is put forward irrespectively of IP 
governance form. However, we find that the firms employ specific governance forms 
(e.g. simple licensing out or in, cross-licensing, patent-pooling, etc) in order to 
achieve specific strategic benefits. 
Therefore, understanding strategic value seeking (related to innovation, 
financial gain, competitive positioning, and strategic relationships) through IP on the 
part of ICT firms requires that we take into account a greater variety forms of IP (both 
proprietary and non-proprietary) and the specific role played by various forms of IP 
governance (such as the role played by specific licensing forms, etc.). Such findings 
open up an important line of enquiry into the distinctive features of the exchange 
processes of different forms of IP, whose results provide useful indications to 
policymakers interested in promoting firms’ ability to create value from their IP.  
 
References 
 23 
Amara, N., Landry, R., and Traore, N. (2008). Managing the protection of innovations 
in knowledge-intensive business services. Research Policy, Vol. 37 (9), 1530-
1547. 
Andersen, B. (2004) If intellectual property rights is the answer, what is the question? 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 13(5): 417–442. 
Andersen, B., Konzelmann, S. (2008) In Search of a Useful Theory of the Productive 
Potential of Intellectual Property Rights, Research Policy, 37, 12-28. 
Akerlof, G.A. (1970) The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), pp. 488-500. 
Arora, A., Fosfuri, A., Gambardella, A. (2001) Markets for Technology: Economics 
of Innovation and Corporate Strategy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, December 
2001 
Arrow, K. (1962) Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. 
In R Nelson (ed.) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 609-25. 
Arundel, A., and Kabla, I., (1998). What Percentage of Innovations are Patented? 
Empirical Estimates for European Firms. Research Policy, 27(2):127-141 
Bachmann, R. (2006) Trust, Power and Control in Trans-organizational Relations, in 
Bessen, J. (2002) What Good is Free Software? In Hahn (Ed.) Government 
Policy toward F/OSS Software. AEI Brooking Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies, Washington D.C.  
Birecree, A., S. Konzelmann and F. Wilkinson (1997), Productive systems, 
competitive pressures, strategic choices and work organisation: an 
introduction, International Contributions to Labour Studies 7 (1), pp. 3–17. 
Blind, K., Edler, J., Schmoch, U., Andersend, B., Howell, J., Miles, I., Roberts J., 
Green, L., Evangelista, R., Hipp, C. and Herstatt, C. (2003) Patents in the 
Service Industries, Final Report. FhG-ISI, Karlsruhe. 
Bonaccorsi, A., Rossi, C. (2003) Contributing to common pool resources. A 
Comparison Between Individuals and Firms’, working paper, Sant’Anna 
School of Advanced Studies, available at: 
http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/bnaccorsirossidevelopers.pdf. 
Chesbrough, H (2003). Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology. Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 24 
Cockburn. I. (2007) Is the Market for Technology Working? Obstacles to Licensing 
inventions, and Ways to Reduce Them. Paper prepared for the Conference on 
Economics of Technology Policy, Monte Verità, June.  
Cohen, W. Nelson, R., and Walsh, J. (2000). Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or 
Not). NBER Working Paper,  No.w7552  
Cohen, W. Nelson, R., and Walsh, J. (2002). Links and Impacts: The Influence of 
Public Research on Industrial R&D. Management Science, 48(1), 1-23. 
Coriat, B. and Orsi, F. (2002) Establishing a New Intellectual Property Rghts Regime 
in the United States. Origins, Content and Problems. Research Policy, 31, 
1491–1507. 
Dosi, G., Marengo, L., Pasquali, G. (2006) How much should society fuel the greed 
of innovators? On the relations between appropriability, opportunities and 
rates of innovation, Research Policy, 35, 1110-1121. 
Freeman, C., Perez, C. (1988) Structural crises of adjustment, business cycles and 
investment behaviour, In Dosi et al, “Technical change and economic theory”, 
Pinter, pp. 38-66. 
Gans, J., Stern, S. (2000), Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of 
Creative Destruction, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 
Graham, S.J.H and Somaya, D. (2006) Vermeers and Rembrandts in the Same Attic: 
Complementarity between Copyright and Trademark Leveraging Strategies in 
Software. Georgia Institute of Technology TIGER Working Paper 
Granstrand, O. (1999) Economics and Management of Intellectual Property. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Griliches, Z. (1990) Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A survey, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 28(4), 1661-1707. 
Grindley, P., Teece, D. (2008) Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-
licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, in Teece, D. (ed) “Technological 
know-how, organisational capabilities and strategic management: business 
strategy and enterprise development in competitive environments”, Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing 
Henkel, J. (2002) F/OSS Software from Commercial Firms: Tools, Complements, and 
Collective Invention, GEABA Discussion Paper 02-27. 
 25 
Hill, C. and Jones, G. (2001) Strategic Management, An Integrated Approach, fifth 
ed. Hoghton Mifflin.  
IBM (2006) Building a New IP Marketplace: A Global Innovation Outlook 2.0, 
Innovation Outlook Report, IP marketplace 
Jaffe, A.B., Trajtenberg, M. and Henderson, R. (1993) Geographical Localisation of 
Knowledge Spillovers, as Evidenced by Patent Citations. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 58(3), 577–598. 
Katila, R., and Ahuja, G., (2002). Something Old, Something New: A longitudinal 
Study of Search Behaviour and new Product Introductions. Academy of 
Management Journal, 45:1183-1194 
Kuan, J. (2001) F/OSS Software as Consumer Integration into Production, Working 
Paper available at: www.papers.ssrn.com/ paper.taf?abstract_id=259648. 
Levin, R., Klevorick, A., Nelson, R., Winter, S., Gilbert, R., and Griliches, Z. (1987). 
appropriating the returns from industrial research and development, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 3. 
Mann, Ronald J.,(2005) Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?,. 
Texas Law Review, 83,961-1030 
Mansfield, E. (1986) Patents and innovation: An empirical study, Management 
Science 32, 173-181 
Mansfield, E. (1991) Academic research and industrial innovation, Research Policy, 
20, 1-12. 
Mergers, R. and Nelson, R. (1990) On the complex economics of patent scope, 
Columbia Law Review, 90 (1), 839-961. 
Munari, F., Santoni, S. (2009) Exploiting complementarities in IPR mechanisms: the 
joint use of patents, trademarks and designs by SMEs, paper prepared for the 
4th Annual Conference of the EPIP Association – 24-25 September 2009. 
Nelson, R.R. (1959) The simple economics of basic scientific research, The Journal of 
Political Economy, 67/3: 297-306. 
Nelson, R (1989) What Is Private and What Is Public About Technology? Science, 
Technology & Human Values, Vol. 14, No. 3, 229-241 (1989) 
Plant, A. (1934) The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions. 
Economica, 1, New Series, 30–51. 
 26 
Pitkethly, R. (2001) Intellectual property strategy in Japanese and UK companies: 
patent licensing decisions and leaning opportunities, Research Policy, Vol. 30, 
425-442 
Porter, M. (1996) What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, November-December, 
61-78 
Reitzig, M. (2004). Strategic management of Intellectual Property. MIT Sloan 
Management Review, 45(3):35-40 
Rivera-Batiz. L. and Romer, P. (1991). Economic integration and endogenous growth, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May. 
Rivette, K. and Kline, D. (2000) Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the Hidden 
Value of Patents. MA: Harvard Business School University Press. 
Robson, S., Haigh, G. (2008) First findings from the UK Innovation Survey 2007, 
Economic & Labour Market Review, Vol 2, No 4, April 
Teece, D. (1986) Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy. Research Policy, 15, 
285–305. 
Trajtenberg, M., Henderson, R., Jaffe, A. B. (1997), University versus corporate 
patents: A window on  the basicness of inventions, Economics of Innovation 
and New Technology, 5 : 19–50.   
Wichmann, T. (2002a) Basics of F/OSS software markets and business models, 
Free/Libre and F/OSS Software: Survey and Study, FLOSS Final Report, 
International Institute of Infonomics, Berlecom Research GmbH. 
Wichmann, T. (2002b). Firms’ F/OSS activities: motivations and policy implications, 
Free/Libre and F/OSS Software: Survey and Study, FLOSS Final Report, 
International Institute of Infonomics, Berlecom Research GmbH. 
Wilkinson, 1983 F. Wilkinson, Productive systems, Cambridge Journal of Economics 
7 (1983), pp. 413–429. 
Wilkinson, 2002 F. Wilkinson, Productive systems and the structuring role of 
economic and social theories. In: J. Michie, Editor, Systems of Production: 
Markets, Organisations and Performance, Routledge, London (2002). 
Williamson, O., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Application. 
Free Press, New York. 
Williamson, O., 1998. Transaction cost economics: how it works; where it is headed. 
De Economist 146, 23–58 
 27 
Winter, S. (1993) Patents and Welfare in an Evolutionary Model. Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 2, 211–231. 
